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Abstract 
This paper surveys some of the ancient Greek and Roman evidence regarding rewards 
for science and scientists. It discusses Platonist views on whether science ought to be 
its own reward, and possible alternatives to such views. It concludes that a variety of 
attitudes existed on the issue in antiquity, and that they can be understood in terms of 
the social and economic status of ancient science practitioners. 
Keywords: rewards, applied science, pure science 
 
One of the most famous stories about science and rewards circulating in antiquity, is 
the anecdote of Euclid and the obol: 
 
Someone who had started to do geometry with Euclid, as he learned the first 
theorem, asked Euclid: “What shall I gain learning these things?” And Euclid 
having called a slave said: “Give him three obols, because he needs to profit 
from these things.”1 
 
Notice that the inept learner’s question is open-ended as to what might count as 
‘benefit’ — he may have meant benefits other than money, but Euclid’s answer is 
very specifically about kerdos, profit, which here is both negative and monetary, what 
                                                             
1 Stobaeus, Florilegium II 228.25-9 (ed. Wachsmuth), fifth century CE, my translation. Cf. Michalis 
Sialaros, “How Much Does a Theorem Cost?,” in Revolutions and Continuity in Greek Mathematics, 
edited by Michalis Sialaros (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018), pp. 89-106. 
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in Italian would be referred to as “il vile denaro.” Kerdos suggests the neglect or even 
crossing of ethical rules in the pursuit of profit. It is also to be noted that, not 
accidentally, the protagonist of the story is a mathematician, whose fame is linked to a 
work with no immediately apparent practical applications, and which needs to be 
studied carefully and systematically, as is hinted here. 
This famous anecdote is almost certainly spurious, but also a good example of 
an idea which enjoyed widespread currency in ancient Greece and Rome, namely that 
science ought to be its own reward. In this paper I take ancient ‘science’ to map onto 
the domain both of episteme/scientia, and of techne/ars. This not only allows us to 
include medicine and architecture alongside mathematics and natural philosophy, but 
it also acknowledges the contested nature of knowledge at the time. While I am aware 
that other types of reward were available, in this paper I concentrate on financial 
rewards, or those leading to financial benefit. Finally, I draw on evidence both Greek 
and Roman, with some disregard for chronology, but that is partly justified by the fact 
that there were diachronic, trans-cultural trends, as I hope to demonstrate.  
Euclid is not the only ancient hero of knowledge for the sake of knowledge — 
we also have, famously, Plutarch’s Archimedes, who spurned any kind of concrete 
benefit stemming from his research, and could lose himself completely in his 
diagrams,2 or, on the Roman side, Pliny the Elder, who not only died in the pursuit of 
science, but talked at length about the horrors visited on the environment by the quest 
for profit.3 As an active member of the elite, Pliny knew quite well the problem, also 
discussed by Cicero, particularly in De officiis, of reconciling the love of knowledge 
with the demands of a busy life.  
                                                             
2  Plutarch, Life of Marcellus 14.3-4, 17.3-4, 6. Cf. Mary Jaeger, Archimedes and the Roman 
Imagination (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008). 
3 Pliny the Elder, Natural History e.g. 33.1, 36.1. Cf. Eugenia Lao, “Luxury and the Creation of a Good 
Consumer,” in Pliny the Elder: Themes and Contexts, edited by Roy K. Gibson, Ruth Morello (Leiden: 
Brill, 2011), pp. 35-56.  
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Ancient sources, however, do not just celebrate the heroes and martyrs of 
science. We also have a well-established villain, in the person who sells his 
knowledge for money — despite modern rehabilitations, think for instance of the 
Sophists in Plato or in Aristophanes, whose Clouds typically subverts roles and values 
by not only casting Socrates as morally ambiguous at least, but also by having 
characters subtly undermine the ideals of the Athenian elite:  
 
STREPSIADES: That is the thinking house of sapient souls. There dwell the 
men who teach — aye, who persuade us, that heaven is one vast fire-
extinguisher placed round about us, and that we're the cinders. And they’ll teach 
(only, they’ll want some money) how one may speak and conquer, right or 
wrong.  
PHIDIPPIDES: Come, tell their names.  
STREPSIADES: Well, I can’t quite remember, but they’re deep thinkers, and 
true gentlemen.4  
 
Τhe emphasis in this brief exchange is not only on the silver involved in the 
transaction, but also on the fact that the sophists were, notoriously, uninterested in 
right or wrong, as long as they could win an argument. The education they provided 
for a fee made a mockery of the ideal of the “good and beautiful” (καλοί τε κἀγαθοί, 
here translated “true gentlemen”), or, in later parlance, the “liberally educated” 
(πεπαδεῦμενοι), upheld by many of the extant Greek and later Roman authors. Thus, 
                                                             
4 Aristophanes, Clouds 94-102 (tr. Loeb). The literature on this theme in Aristophanes is vast; see e.g. 
Carlo F. Russo, Aristofane, autore di teatro (Firenze: Sansoni, 19922), pp. 178-179; Michele Stanco, 
“Il filosofo tra le nuvole: la figura di Socrate in Aristofane e nell’intertesto contemporaneo,” in 
Comparatistica e intertestualità. Studi in onore di Franco Marenco, edited by Giuseppe Sertoli, Carla 
Vaglio Marengo, Chiara Lombardi, vol. 1 (Alessandria: Edizioni Dell’Orso, 2010), pp. 73-80 [non 
vidi]. 
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many more examples could be cited, but the gist is that knowledge is an absolute 
value, that should be pursued for itself, not for the advantages it may bring. In this 
worldview, rewards are extraneous, epiphenomenal, a dangerous distraction, a means 
of corruption. 
If all this sounds vaguely Platonic, that’s because it is — in the Republic, for 
instance, we find as a recurrent theme the idea that pursuing true knowledge is 
immensely rewarding, to the point of obliterating the desire or inclination to engage in 
more worldy affairs. When describing what happens when the men who have been 
freed out of the cave and seen the sun and the world as it truly is, are asked to return 
to the cave, to their fellow prisoners, Socrates says: 
 
“If they had any honours among them there, any accolades and rewards for 
anyone who could see the passing images most distinctly and could best recall 
which of them came first, which came last, and which came along together, and 
as a result of this was best at predicting what would come next, would you think 
he would long for them and envy those people among them who were honoured 
and exercised power, or would he experience what Homer says and eagerly 
wish ‘to be slave tending a field for someone else, a person of no renown’ and 
undergo anything rather than what he thought about down there and live in the 
way he did down there?” 
“I think that’s true,” he [Glaucon] said. “He would agree to undergo everything 
rather than live as they do down there.” […] 
“[D]on’t be surprised that those who go there are not willing to engage in 
human affairs, but their souls constantly hurry upward to spend their time up 
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there, and that is what we would surely expect, if the image we have talked 
about is right in this aspect too.”5 
 
This dilemma is basically the inspiration for Cicero’s De officiis: how can one both be 
a true philosopher, and live in the real world? How can the pursuit of truth be 
reconciled with daily necessities? In book 7 of the Republic, the guardians' education 
is knowledge with a purpose (that of ruling the city), but at the same time it is so 
disconnected from the idea of reward that, in the myth of the cave, the people who 
have achieved true knowledge and are thus forced to return to the cave (or rule the 
city), suffer what is seen as a punishment, in that they are not free to spend their entire 
time ‘looking upwards,’ because they remain enmeshed in wordly realities. In other 
words, far from being rewarded, true knowledge is marked by deprivation and loss. 
The Homeric words that Socrates is quoting in the Platonic passage are from the 
episode in the Odyssey where Odysseus meets a very changed Achilles in the 
underworld,6 and is perhaps a somber reflection on things other than science, which 
were generally seen as goods in themselves at the time. For instance, glory in battle or 
dying for the father- or motherland, such as we find, for instance, in Pericles’ funeral 
speech in Thucycides, which highlights the trifecta of freedom, power and education: 
Athens is powerful and free — powerful because she is free — and she is also the 
school of Hellas.7 Or again, victory at the Olympic games, which was rewarded, in 
principle, simply with an olive branch. Athletics and war were connected in many 
ways; it is perhaps here that we should seek the roots of the image of the scientist as 
                                                             
5 Plato, Republic 516c-d, 517c-d (tr. Loeb). 
6 Homer, Odyssey 11.489-90 (tr. Loeb): “Nay, seek not to speak soothingly to me of death, glorious 
Odysseus. I should choose, so I might live on earth, to serve as the hireling of another, of some 
portionless man whose livelihood was but small, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have 
perished.” 
7 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.40.5-41.1. 
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an athlete of the mind, as a fighter (think of the war against disease), or, as its flipside, 
the image of the ‘mercenary’ scientist. By putting knowledge ahead of other things 
which may have been seen as their own reward, Plato operated a revolutionary shift. 
By the early imperial period the idea of an education proper for the ideal citizen 
(the Greek paideia) had received influential articulation in the writings of, among 
others, Seneca:  
 
You have been wishing to know my views with regard to liberal studies. My 
answer is this: I respect no study, and deem no study good, which results in 
money-making. Such studies are profit-bringing occupations, useful only in so 
far as they give the mind a preparation and do not engage it permanently. One 
should linger upon them only so long as the mind can occupy itself with nothing 
greater; they are our apprenticeship, not our real work. Hence you see why 
‘liberal studies’ are so called; it is because they are studies worthy of a free-born 
gentleman. But there is only one really liberal study, — that which gives a man 
his liberty. It is the study of wisdom, and that is lofty, brave, and great-souled. 
All other studies are puny and puerile.8 
 
Seneca goes on to emphasize the moral shallowness of sciences like arithmetic and 
geometry, when taken by themselves or aimed at practical activities such as 
measuring land, rather than as ancillary to philosophy. Intrinsic to the very term 
‘liberal studies,’ is a complete identification between the type of knowledge someone 
possesses, and the quality or status of that person. Knowledge must be independent 
                                                             
8 Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 88.1-2 (tr. Loeb). 
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and self-sufficient: it must be free. If knowledge comes with a reward or, horribile 
dictu, a wage, then it is no longer free, but slavish, because it depends on another.  
While we may not share all of Seneca’s reference points, his ideal of knowledge 
unimpeded by mundane considerations still resonates today. Think for instance, at 
least in the UK, of the conflict between the measurable impact required by the REF 
(governmental research assessment), and so-called blue-skies research, or of the 
ambiguity academic historians feel around media work, also known as ‘selling out’, 
or of having to relate to students as ‘customers.’ In other words, in our daily lives as 
beleaguered and hassled academics, the story of Euclid and the obol strikes a chord. 
And yet, one might well ask: is a different reaction to the story possible? The 
fact that we see Euclid’s student as someone who fundamentally ‘doesn’t get it,’ 
indicates that, as academics, we have been socialized and trained into forming a 
community where the ideal of knowledge being its own reward is paramount. It is an 
ideal we have entirely internalized. And yet, we know from the history and sociology 
of science that the conflation of type of knowledge and type of knower is not innocent. 
It is a marginalizing move in a contest about science, but also about society.9 
Thus, we need to step back and acknowledge that the ideal of disinterested 
science is a historical construction. Plato’s vision stood in contrast to a reality where 
science — not necessarily of the ‘right’ kind — was indeed rewarded. The sophists 
were socially and financially successful; traders and bankers used their arithmetical 
skills for profit; doctors obtained civic honours,10 privileges,11 money and, through 
money, freedom: 
                                                             
9 Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).  
10 Vivian Nutton, “Archiatri and the Medical Profession in Antiquity,” Papers of the British School at 
Rome, 1977, 45:191-226 listed 93 inscriptions, papyri and coins from the Hellenistic period onwards, 
relating to archiatri. See more recently Évelyne Samama, Les médicins dans le monde grec. Sources 
épigraphiques sur la naissance d’un corps medical (Genève: Droz, 2003). 
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Publius Decimius Eros Merula, freedman of Publius, clinical doctor, surgeon, 
oculist, member of the board of six. For his freedom he paid 50,000 sesterces. 
For his membership on the board of six he contributed to the community 2,000 
sesterces. For the erection of statues in the temple of Hercules he gave 30,000 
sesterces. For paving streets he contributed to the municipal treasury 37,000 
sesterces. On the day before he died he left an estate of… sesterces.12 
 
Specialist doctors could evidently be rewarded quite substantially, especially if their 
clients were members of the upper strata of society. Catapult builders, among whom 
we can count Archimedes himself, were often rewarded by kings themselves. The 
origin story for the catapult that we find in Diodorus revolves entirely around rewards. 
Not only does Dionysius of Syracuse gather “skilled workmen, commandeering them 
from the cities under his control and attracting them by high wages from Italy and 
Greece as well as Carthaginian territory”; he also keeps providing incentives, both 
financial and social, after gathering a critical mass of military technology experts in 
one place: “Dionysius circulated daily among the workers, conversed with them in 
kindly fashion, and rewarded the most zealous with gifts and invited them to his 
table.”13 Soon enough, the catapult had been invented, or so Diodorus claims.  
There are interesting parallels between the Greek historian’s perspective and 
that of a practitioner: Philo of Byzantium links another military technology discovery, 
this time that the diameter of the cylinder holding the torsion spring of a catapult is 
the module for the other parts of the catapult, also to the patronage of kings:  
                                                                                                                                                                              
11 E.g. Democedes in Herodotus 3.133-7; Pliny the Younger’s iatraliptes in his Letters 10.5. 
12 CIL XI 5400, found in Assisi (central Italy), possibly 1st century CE (tr. Lewis, Reinhold). 
13 Diodorus, The Library of History 14.41-42 (tr. Loeb). Cf. Serafina Cuomo, Technology and Culture 
in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 2. 
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People later on, observing previous mistakes and from what had been 
experienced afterwards looking carefully for an established element, led to the 
basic principle and foundation of the construction, namely the diameter of the 
circle that holds the spring. Alexandrian technicians achieved this first, being 
heavily subsidized because they had kings who were lovers of fame and lovers 
of technology.14 
 
In the practitioners’ own descriptions, the rewards for knowledge often come in the 
form of honour and recognition in the community, with a comfortable financial 
position receding to the background — these scientists are moral heroes, but in ways 
that are subtly different from the heroes of disinterested science we saw earlier. A 
good example is Galen — he did not shy away from reporting on the rewards that his 
knowledge brought him, 15  even though in his encounters with members of the 
imperial family he seems to emphasize praise (and the envy of his rivals) as a reward, 
over the inevitable financial gains. In his Protreptikos he lists as ‘good knowledge’ a 
throng of disciplines which includes geometry, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, 
but also the more economically viable painting, sculpting, architecture and elementary 
teaching, and tackles quite explicitly the issue of money:  
 
[M]aking money by one’s own efforts is not in itself admirable; it is only 
admirable if one has true understanding of an art — the kind of art which will 
“float with one in the case of a shipwreck.” This is not something which 
                                                             
14 Philo of Byzantium, Construction of catapults 50 (tr. Marsden), modified. 
15 E.g. Galen, On Prognosis 8.19-21, where he mentions both money and a connection to the emperor 
as consequence of healing a patient. Cf. Susan P. Mattern, Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 
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belongs to those who manage other people’s financial affairs, nor to tax-
farmers or merchants. Such people get more money from their activities than 
anyone; but, if they lose their money, they are also unable to perform these 
activities […]. So, if what is required is a training that will lead to a secure 
livelihood which is at the same time honourable, the answer is a lifelong 
dedication to Art.16 
  
Galen concludes by adding that the arts which are less labour-intensive are preferable 
— but because they can be practised into old age. The difference is not presented as a 
matter of lower status, or slavishness.  
Galen’s words about a shipwreck allude to a notion we also find in Vitruvius — 
that the most valuable possessions are those which would not be lost in a shipwreck, 
such as knowledge, particularly knowledge of the kind that enables the knower to 
make a living out of it. Indeed, Vitruvius displays an amazingly complex set of views 
about the rewards of science, in his case, architecture. He is both aware of the 
financial aspects of his profession, and willing to subordinate them to good reputation 
and morally correct conduct.17 There has been some discussion as to what rewards 
Vitruvius hoped to reap by writing De architectura. Some say recognition as a literary 
author, some suggest that he may also have been interested in continuing to enjoy the 
patronage of the imperial family. Even Archimedes played the courtly game in 
addressing his short treatise Sand-reckoner to a king of Syracuse, using the rhetoric of 
                                                             
16 Galen, An Exhortation to Study the Arts K37-38 (tr. Singer). 
17 E.g. Vitruvius, On Architecture 6. preface; 9. preface. Cf. Elisa Romano, La capanna e il tempio: 
Vitruvio o dell’architettura (Palermo: Palumbo, 1987); Antoinette Novara, Auctor in bibliotheca. Essai 
sur les textes préfaciels de Vitruve et une philosophie latine du Livre (Leuven: Peeters, 2005). 
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numbering multitudes and harnessing infinity, in a way that Reviel Netz has shown to 
chime in with contemporary Hellenistic poetry.18  
To summarize, what we see is a discrepancy between the ideal of disinterested 
science, and the reality of mercenary, or at least patronage-friendly, science. This may 
have corresponded to asymmetries in social status. Those who could afford it, either 
members of the elite or recipients of patronage, practised disinterested science, 
whereas all the others, including the architect’s son Galen, had to make a living and 
consequently represented their knowledge as more reward-friendly. This distinction 
would have created a further asymmetry between more ‘theoretical’ forms of 
knowledge, such as philosophy or advanced geometry, the preserve of the privileged 
few, and applied science, practised by the less privileged but shunned by the elite. 
There is a corollary assumption that the non-elite would naturally aspire to become 
elite, and therefore epistemically the exponents of ‘applied’ science would be 
expected to seek legitimacy by giving their discipline a literary and theoretical veneer.  
And yet, such a simple binary mapping of social and epistemic status does not 
fit the evidence. Social and epistemical aspirations need to be evaluated more 
carefully — sharing in literate culture does not amount to endorsing or seeking 
legitimation from it. Arguably, scientific writers forged their own distinctive literary 
cultural identity. Secondly, and more importantly, this is not just a matter of different 
social perspectives. The very idea of science being its own reward originated, in my 
view, as a means to reinforce asymmetries in social status, and to appropriate the 
nexus between power and knowledge to some sectors of society over others. In other 
words, the idea of disinterested science, whose most influential articulation dates to 
fourth-century BCE Athens, is in essence an aristocratic idea, and an anti-democratic 
                                                             
18  Reviel Netz, Ludic Proof. Greek Mathematics and the Alexandrian Aesthetic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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idea. Its values are constructed so as to impede rewarding of expertise leading to 
social mobility. It is not so much that if you are rich you do not need rewards, ergo 
from your vantage point knowledge is its own reward — it is the idea that you should 
positively not want to be rewarded for knowledge, ergo only those who can do 
without a reward are seen as able fully to engage in the pursuit of knowledge.  
This becomes especially clear if we, following Seneca’s lead, bring slavery into 
the equation. Knowledgeable slaves are paradoxical to the nexus of power and 
knowledge because they have lots of knowledge, but in principle none of the power. 
The long episode in Petronius’ Satyricon known as Cena Trimalchionis displays, 
among other things, the contrast between different types of knowledge and what 
rewards they have brought the protagonist (the freedman Trimalchio), his friends, also 
mostly ex-slaves, and their families. In the (reported) words of one of Trimalchio’s 
guests to his child: 
 
Mark my words, Primigenius, whatever you learn, you learn for your own good. 
Look at Phileros, the barrister: if he had not worked, he would not be keeping 
the wolf from the door today. It is not so long since he used to carry things 
round on his back and sell them, and now he makes a brave show even against 
Norbanus. Yes, education is a treasure, and culture never dies.19  
 
There is no doubt that the passage is satyrical, but once its subversive potential is 
activated, the satyre can cut both ways, depending on the public. One can laugh at the 
freedman’s idea of education, but also laugh with him at the thought of how far he has 
come in the world, despite it all. Petronius exposes Trimalchio’s lack of paideia, and 
                                                             
19 Petronius, Satyricon 46 (tr. Loeb). Cf. Victoria Rimell, “Petronius’ Encyclopedia: Neronian Lessons 
in Learning – The Hard Way,” in Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire, edited by Jason König, 
Tim Whitmarsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 108-132. 
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yet at the same time, he lays bare the fact that kinds of knowledge other than paideia 
might have made a dramatic difference in real life to the fortunes of former slaves. It 
is all very well to decree that the knowledge of a free man must be detached from 
profit, if you are a wealthy senator. The knowledge of Trimalchio and his friends (and 
of Eros Merula), by being illiberally profitable, and not without some luck, has made 
them free. They stand as heroes of knowledge, of yet another kind from what we have 
seen so far — a more adventurous and precarious kind. 
In conclusion, the idea that science ought to be its own reward is part of the 
legacy of ancient Greece and Rome, contained in the same vaguely Platonist package 
as the idea of a liberal education. At the same time, we must be aware that, 
historically, the notion of disinterested science as opposed to mercenary knowledge, 
may have been formulated in order to uphold specific social and political hierarchies. 
Accordingly, it was contested. Knowledge can set you free, both because it can detach 
you from the prison of mundanity — the necessity of making money — and precisely 
because it makes you money, and brings you benefits of a tangible kind. The question 
we are left with is then, which part of that legacy should we espouse as our ideal, 
today?  
